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Game-changer in the Pacific:  
Surprising Options Open Up with the 
New Multi-purpose Maritime Capability 
John Blaxland 
Compelling reasons for developing and maintaining a robust amphibious force as part of the 
ADF‟s suite of military capabilities are not hard to find.  They are based on sound liberal and 
realist imperatives for Australian leadership in the Pacific and beyond to foster and maintain 
regional security and stability.  Experience after the Indian Ocean Tsunami and repeated 
deployments off the coast of Fiji is instructive, but so is Australia‟s experience dating back for a 
century, considered briefly in this article.  That experience suggests a robust amphibious 
capability could make a significant difference to Australia‟s regional diplomatic leverage, 
providing relatively significant hard power to complement the government‟s diplomatic soft 
power in support of the nation‟s humanitarian, liberal-democratic and realist instincts. 
Facing significant financial pressures, the Department of Defence is looking 
to make some hard decisions about capabilities that may be optional and 
which, some would argue, can be mothballed for now.  One capability that 
may be under consideration is one or both of the new amphibious landing 
helicopter dock ships, or LHDs, being built jointly by BAE Systems Australia 
and Spain's Navantia.  The first hull is now being fitted out near Melbourne 
and the second is under construction in Spain.  On paper, the cutback option 
may appear attractive, with some critics questioning their justification, their 
utility, their protection, and the appropriateness of developing a Marine 
Corps-like amphibious capability for the army and navy.
1
  But there are 
compelling reasons for not taking the axe to them. 
In a time of increased political and strategic uncertainty and unprecedented 
environmental challenges, there are some benefits for Australia and the 
region that can be expected to accrue from properly developing, maintaining 
and resourcing the new amphibious capability.  There is a range of other 
surprising instances where amphibious forces have demonstrated their utility 
in Australia‟s history.  To fully understand the efficacy of such capabilities to 
Australia‟s defence and security, it is worth reflecting briefly on how 
amphibious forces have contributed to Australia‟s defence and security in the 
past, particularly during the world wars as well as in more recent decades.  
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Amphibious Forces and the World Wars 
Gallipoli features as one of the touchstone moments in the formation of an 
Australian identity.  Yet while American Marines closely study the Gallipoli 
campaign for operational lessons on amphibious operations, the Australian 
experience is one of mythologising the event rather than studying it for 
applicable lessons today.  Closer to home, Australia‟s first major 
engagement in the First World War, undertaken by the Australian Naval and 
Military Expeditionary Force, involved the seizure of the German colony 
based at Rabaul in what is now Papua New Guinea in September 1914.  
The incident was relatively painless and uneventful, but it pointed to the 
enduring utility of land and naval forces collaborating to enhance Australia‟s 
security in a region with thousands of islands. 
During the Second World War Australians deployed troops ashore from 
ships in places like East Timor in 1942, Finschhaffen (on the coast of New 
Guinea) in 1943, and in Balikpapan, Borneo, in the Netherlands East Indies 
(now Indonesia) in 1945.
2
  In naval folklore the pride of the fleet were the 
major fighting ships, including HMAS Sydney and HMAS Australia.  But the 
ships most in demand were the „ugly ducklings‟ of the fleet, the amphibious 
ships HMAS Manoora, HMAS Kanimbla and HMAS Westralia.  They 
operated effectively in what could be called the „twilight zone‟ known as the 
littorals.  This was an area that, in some ways, was in between the areas 
traditionally dominated by land forces and naval forces—a domain that 
neither the army nor the navy appeared to be really comfortable with owning 
and mastering.  
Post-War Hiatus 
By the end of the war, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) had a fleet of six 
LSTs, able to project land forces at an unprecedented level.  This capability 
would soon atrophy, with distracting commitments to the post-war 
occupation of Japan, followed by the Korean War, Malayan Emergency, and 
Confrontation in Borneo as well as the war in Vietnam—although HMAS 
Sydney and accompanying vessels played an important role in ferrying 
troops and equipment to and from Vietnam.  In essence, however, during 
these years both the RAN and the Australian Army let lapse much of the 
amphibious capability which had proven to be in such great demand at the 
height of the campaigns in the South and South-West Pacific.  
In the minds of many, amphibious operations came to be associated with the 
apparent excesses of the bloody fight against the Japanese across the 
Pacific.  Little thought appears to have been given to the remarkable utility 
and versatility that accrued from maintaining a robust amphibious capability.  
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No one is seriously considering the recurrence of an event on this scale, nor 
does anyone envisage, even in the unlikely event of a major war, that 
Australia‟s modern-day amphibious vessels would be used for an Iwo Jima-
like scenario of troops going ashore across a bullet-ridden beach.  The 
advent of helicopters, satellite imagery and advanced intelligence, coupled 
with robust special forces capabilities, makes such scenarios a particularly 
remote prospect.  But the images of places like Balikpapan were hard to 
shake from popular consciousness.  Yet there would be numerous instances 
where land and naval forces worked together on unanticipated operations. 
Consider for a moment Cyclone Tracy which struck Darwin on Christmas 
Eve 1974: one of the most useful platforms in the ADF's inventory to help out 
was the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne.  With helicopters and stores 
embarked, the arrival of HMAS Melbourne in Darwin along with the escort 
maintenance ship HMAS Stalwart and a further eleven naval vessels made a 
significant material difference to the pace and extent of the recovery 
operations.  The new LHDs offer considerably greater flexibility and 
capability than did the old carrier.  
After Cyclone Tracy, HMAS Melbourne was decommissioned with the 
intention for it to be replaced in 1982.  The decision to replace HMAS 
Melbourne was reversed after the British withdrew their offer of the aircraft 
carrier HMS Invincible once it proved so useful to the British during the 1982 
Falklands War.  Thankfully, the RAN had at least acquired an amphibious 
Landing Ship Tank (LST), HMAS Tobruk in 1981.  Yet even then, little effort 
was made to reflect on the lessons from Britain‟s experience and to adjust 
Australia‟s force posture accordingly.  HMAS Tobruk provided the Australian 
Defence Force with a modest amphibious lift capability, with a helicopter 
deck, but no command and control facilities for an embarked force.  But 
beyond the ability to carry a helicopter on HMAS Tobruk, and on the navy‟s 
frigates, whatever air cover was required in Australia‟s immediate environs, 
strategic policy officers argued, could be provided for with land-based RAAF 
aircraft.  While the LHD‟s are not intended to carry fixed wing aircraft, they 
will nevertheless be able to carry eleven helicopters and, if required 
unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence and surveillance support.  In effect 
they will be considerably more potent than the aircraft carrier HMAS 
Melbourne ever was. 
Operation Morris Dance 1987  
There is one operation undertaken shortly before the end of the Cold War, 
which took place in the Pacific and which illustrated some of the Australian 
Defence Force‟s (ADF) amphibious shortcomings and which pointed to 
areas requiring improvement.  That was Operation Morris Dance.  
The events of May 1987, when Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka and 
elements of the Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) staged a military coup in 
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Suva served to illustrate the limits of Australian soft and hard power.  
Rabuka seized power in an attempt to secure traditional Fijian land 
ownership and to ensure that political power remained in the control of ethnic 
Fijians.  The key government ministers managing the crisis in Australia, 
Prime Minister Bob Hawke, Defence Minister Kim Beazley and Acting 
Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans, initially wanted to see what they 
could do to rescue the deposed Fijian Prime Minister, Timoci Bavadra, with 
perhaps a helicopter sent in to accomplish a rescue.  But the Chief of 
Defence Force, General Peter Gration, was consulted and he quickly and 
clearly explained the virtually insurmountable obstacles with such a proposal 
including the difficulty in locating the captive prime minister‟s exact 
whereabouts and the logistic difficulties in getting in and getting him out.
3
  
Once it was clear that New Zealand was not interested in mounting a military 
operation, Hawke, Beazley and Evans quickly rejected military intervention.  
This was particularly the case once it became known early on that there was 
widespread support amongst Fijians for the coup. 
Nonetheless, considerable planning was undertaken in Canberra, coupled 
with briefings from the Joint Intelligence Organisation, but it was not until 20 
May 1987 that a warning order was issued for preparations to commence to 
support the potential evacuation of an estimated 4000 Australian nationals 
from Fiji.  The Townsville-based Operational Deployment Force had been 
designated for response to contingencies that might arise in Australia‟s 
region.  
The Advance Company Group was then flown by RAAF C-130 Hercules 
aircraft from Townsville to Norfolk Island and deployed in an ad-hoc fashion 
onboard a variety of Australian naval vessels; firstly the amphibious ship, 
HMAS Tobruk and subsequently the supply ship, HMAS Success, and the 
warships HMAS Parramatta and HMAS Sydney.  None of these last three 
ships were intended for landing troops ashore.  For fifteen days the troops 
stood by, spread out amongst the four ships, reviewing intelligence briefs 
and plans and conducting physical training in the ships off the Fijian coast, 
2000 nautical miles from Australia.  By 7 June the troops were back home. 
The operation was, on one level, uneventful.  But the operational concept for 
the deployment presumed the Fijian authorities would be prepared to 
facilitate the entry of Australian forces to extricate their evacuees.  This 
planning relied on untested assumptions that could have exposed the force 
to significant difficulties beyond those they experienced.  Indeed, General 
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Gration “only saw the infantry company as evacuation marshals in a 
permissive environment.  They were never going to contest with the RFMF.”
4
 
The operation off the coast of Fiji was never intended to test the limits of 
Australian military capabilities.  But that fact was premised on the 
understanding that Australia simply did not have the capability to deploy 
sufficient force off the coast of Fiji to assert itself and influence the outcome 
in the event of a deteriorating security situation ashore.  
Beyond any desire by the government to influence domestic political events 
in a South Pacific nation, the most fundamental issue relates to the ability of 
the Australian Government to protect its citizens overseas.  Had the Fijian 
authorities refused to cooperate in the event of calls for an evacuation the 
only option left would be for the citizens to be abandoned or for a very large 
operation to be mounted against opposition.  In the latter case, the 
Australians could have been used as hostages and, lacking a robust 
amphibious capability like the LHDs, the government would have been faced 
with being unable to do anything of substance to assist or rescue its citizens.  
The experience of operating off the coast of Fiji in 1987, when juxtaposed 
against the strategic guidance in the 1987 Defence White Paper, 
symbolically illustrated the paradox of Australian governments emphasising 
defence of continental sovereignty while feeling compelled to deploy forces 
well beyond the air and sea approaches to the continent when unforeseen 
circumstances arose. 
As a consequence, the experience would influence the key strategic 
planning document prepared in 1989 entitled Australia’s Strategic Planning 
in the 1990s.
5
  This document did not advocate a change of policy but 
recognised that situations might arise that could require the defence force to 
become involved in the South Pacific, including evacuation of citizens or 
natural disaster relief.
6
  
Operation Morris Dance provided a sobering demonstration of the limits of 
Australian military power in the late 1980s.  Even if it had wanted to or 
needed to, Australia simply could not have deployed a land force into the 
South Pacific safely and effectively if there was any prospect of onshore 
opposition to such a move.  The LHDs are set to change the equation 
completely. 
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Post-Cold War Operations 
With the end of the Cold War, the tempo of ADF operational deployments 
increased markedly.  In 1993, for instance, the 1 RAR Battalion Group 
deployed to Somalia employing HMAS Tobruk as the key support vessel.  
But being far away and not related to the direct defence of Australia, there 
were few lessons for the ADF that were thought to be worth learning from 
the experience—including concerning the utility of an expanded amphibious 
force. 
Amphibious vessels were widely used for both missions to Bougainville in 
1994 and again from late 1997 onwards.  In 1994, for instance, HMAS 
Tobruk was loaded to capacity for the transit from Townsville to Bougainville.  
The experience demonstrated that the ADF would benefit from additional 
amphibious ships. 
Subsequently two additional amphibious ships, HMAS Manoora and HMAS 
Kanimbla, were added to the inventory in 1994.  Together with HMAS 
Tobruk, once they were refurbished, they became the most frequently-used 
ships in the fleet, reflecting their importance and utility in support of the 
government‟s priorities.  But even then, their capacity was limited and they 
experienced considerable serviceability challenges. 
More recently, experience in East Timor in 1999 and 2006 as well as in Aceh 
following the 2004 tsunami and other security and humanitarian challenges 
have prominently demonstrated the utility of an LHD-like capability.  
In the case of the international intervention in East Timor in September 1999, 
the mission became heavily dependent on support vessels from our coalition 
partner even though Dili was close to a major Australian port in Darwin.  
Once again, the utility of amphibious vessels was demonstrated with the 
amphibious lodgment on East Timor‟s south coast, near the border with 
West Timor at Suai, in mid-October 1999.  With the onset of the monsoon, 
the viability of the roads across the Timorese mountain range meant that a 
lodgment over the shore in Suai was necessary.  Once again, the limited 
capacity of the ADF in this domain was stretched to capacity and thankfully 
supplemented by coalition partners.  The return of ADF elements to East 
Timor, at short notice, in May 2006, reflected well on significant 
improvements to the ADF‟s amphibious capabilities. 
In the meantime, Australia‟s amphibious forces played a pivotal role in 
enabling the establishment of the Regional Assistance Mission in the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003.  The physical presence of the landing 
platform amphibious ships had an intimidatory effect on those local bandits 
ashore running amok.  The new LHDs are substantially larger and more 
capable than the Landing Platforms Amphibious, HMAS Manoora and HMAS 
Kanimbla, presenting a greater potential psychological impact on potential 
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adversaries ashore, while also facilitating far greater humanitarian 
assistance or disaster relief capabilities in times of need. 
In addition, the tsunami relief operations in and around Aceh in early 2005 
were facilitated by the availability of the ADF‟s amphibious forces.  But, once 
again, the ADF was significantly constrained in what it could offer to assist in 
large part because of the limitations of the amphibious vessels at its 
disposal.  Compared to the amphibious resources employed by other 
regional powers, Australia‟s amphibious capabilities were embarrassingly 
limited. 
Return to the Waters off Fiji 
Again, and also in 2006, following tensions in Fiji between the military and 
the government, three Australian naval vessels were deployed to 
international waters off Fiji in preparation for a potential evacuation of 
Australian citizens.  Operation Quickstep was the name given to the ADF‟s 
operation in response to news of the military coup which occurred on 4 
December 2006, admittedly with no bloodshed, when the RFMF, under 
Commodore Frank Bainimarama, took control of the Fijian Government.  
Like Operation Morris Dance in 1987, Operation Quickstep was only ever 
intended to provide for the permissive evacuation of Australian citizens and 
other approved foreign nationals in the event of an outbreak of violence 
following a military takeover in Fiji.
7
 
While the coup was conducted non-violently, the deployment of forces, as in 
any peace-time military activity, always involves risk.  On 29 November 2006 
a Black Hawk helicopter crashed while attempting to land on the deck of one 
of the ships assigned to Quickstep, the amphibious ship HMAS Kanimbla.  
Nine of the ten crew and passengers were rescued, but two died.  On 20 
December the Australian Government announced that ADF elements 
involved in the operation were being recalled to Australia as the potential 
need for a military-backed evacuation appeared to have passed.  But the 
experience demonstrated that the ADF was not yet configured for, nor fully 
trained for, the kinds of operations in the South Pacific that the government 
would task it to undertake. 
Today two of the three ships, HMAS Kanimbla and HMAS Manoora, have 
been decommissioned, essentially because they were worn out.  They 
proved to be remarkably useful and virtually indispensable platforms.  
Instead, the RAN of 2014 is set to commence operating an LHD alongside 
the recently-acquired Bay Class LST, HMAS Choules.  Together they 
amount to a game changer for any future contingencies the ADF may face in 
the Pacific.  
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Ramifications for the LHDs 
Strangely enough, the lessons on scale, force configuration and 
preparedness from the experience off the coast of Fiji appear to have been 
overlooked in some quarters as strategic planners consider how and why the 
new LHDs may be employed in the coming years.  
These ships are incredibly versatile, being useful for a wide spectrum of 
tasks that include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  These ships 
will enable the rapid deployment of considerable engineering, medical and 
other logistic elements to support rapid rehabilitation of devastated areas.  
Such aid and assistance has contributed significantly to the rebuilding of 
Australia‟s bilateral relationship with Indonesia and, in so doing, assisted in 
enhancing regional stability and security.  With a greater tempo of natural 
disasters and man-made crises anticipated in the coming years, such a 
capability will prove distinctly beneficial. 
At the other end of the spectrum, LHD‟s have sometimes been described as 
vulnerable for high-end warfighting, particularly against a submarine threat.  
But the LHDs were never purchased with the intention of operating on their 
own without protection from other vessels like the Air Warfare Destroyers 
(AWDs) and from the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), at least when close 
enough to land-based airfields.  In addition, the LHDs offer a platform for a 
large number of on-board anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters making 
them versatile not just for amphibious operations but also anti-submarine 
operations.  Some have criticised the acquisition of air-warfare-focused 
AWDs as being too vulnerable to sub-surface attacks from submarines.  But 
the danger is significantly mitigated by working alongside an LHD should 
there be several ASW helicopters embarked.  So configured, an LHD would 
enhance the ASW defences that might be necessary if a submarine threat 
was to be faced by the AWDs. 
In terms of ship-to-shore, the LHDs are suitable for conducting operations 
when invited to dock alongside in a harbour.  Alternatively they are suitable 
for deploying equipment and personnel from a distance offshore by landing 
craft or by helicopter, particularly when docking facilities are damaged or 
destroyed by a natural disaster, or when uninvited.  A critical looming 
shortcoming is the absence of clear plans to acquire a suite of landing craft 
to supplement the capability inherent in the LHDs and HMAS Choules. 
Some have expressed concern that the LHDs will engender a cavalier 
willingness to fight a land war in Asia.
8
  This is a remote prospect and, in a 
counter-intuitive manner, suggests that the Australian Government should 
avoid maintaining such capabilities in case it needs it.  Besides, the lack of 
LHDs has not made a difference in such decisions in the past.  For Australia, 
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numerous military engagements have occurred in Korea, Malaysia and 
Vietnam, for instance (let alone more recently in Afghanistan), when no such 
amphibious capabilities were maintained in the Australian military 
inventory—although during the Vietnam War HMAS Sydney played an 
important supporting role as a troop carrier.  Back then, Australia made 
niche contributions alongside great power allies, relying on others (Britain 
and the United States, primarily) for much of the necessary support.  
But reliance on great and powerful friends to provide relevant amphibious 
capabilities seems increasingly inappropriate as uncertainty in the region 
increases and as demand for short-notice assistance grows in response to 
an increasing range of natural disaster and man-made crisis situations.  
There are compelling reasons, particularly for contingencies in the South 
Pacific and elsewhere nearby to Australia, to maintain a self-sufficient 
capability to reach and to influence events in places experiencing a crisis.   
Nowadays, with sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
assets, and robust helicopters, forces would deploy from ship to a relatively 
safe place onshore away from any highly defended positions, in an area 
most likely already reconnoitred and deemed safe by special forces.  In 
addition, particularly if facing a sophisticated threat, the LHDs would deploy 
under the cover of the security umbrella provided by Australia's modern 
fighter aircraft, air warfare destroyers and submarines.  It would be 
unreasonable to expect Australia to commit to deploying the LHDs in a 
hostile environment without such protection and surveillance assets 
deployed.  While some decry the strategic planning process in defence that 
led to this mix of capabilities, the idea of maintaining a balanced force to 
mitigate a range of risks is actually wholly reasonable and sensible. 
That reasonableness is reinforced when considering the deliberations of a 
number of Australia‟s neighbours.  It is worth noting that several regional 
powers have also deemed reasonable the benefits of maintaining highly-
capable amphibious assets.  In addition to the United States, countries such 
as Japan, South Korea, France (with vessels in New Caledonia) and Russia 
have or are acquiring such platforms.  Others such as Singapore, New 
Zealand and Thailand have also purchased modern amphibious ships for the 
same compelling reasons.  These ships are sought after because they are 
versatile.  
In addition, the Royal Australian Navy simply does not have the personnel to 
operate more than two or three such vessels.  And smaller ones, while able 
to access more remote and smaller ports, would carry less and therefore 
provide less capability per platform.  Besides, these ships are well on the 
way to being completed.  Rather than turn back the clock and waste the 
good work and money invested, the government should consider how best 
these vessels can provide aid and other assistance in the region while 
furthering Australia's interests in fostering regional security and stability.  
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Australia's Defence White Paper in 2009 quite reasonably placed defence of 
Australia as the top priority.
9
  And the Defence White Paper of 2013 stressed 
the importance of regional engagement and military diplomacy.
10
  But there 
are competing priorities for the use of defence resources both within 
Australia and beyond in what is not just a 'sea-air gap‟ but a sea-air-land 
„gap‟ (considering the many islands and platforms out there), where naval 
and army assets, supported by the RAAF, could be called upon to operate, 
at short notice, in a wide range of contingencies.  The LHDs provide some of 
the most useful platforms for operating in and around Australia's vast 
coastline and beyond.  
The contrast with the experience of the C-17 aircraft also is instructive.  The 
Australian Government purchased four C-17s for the RAAF and within 
weeks, they were being used to deliver support after Cyclone Nargis in 
Burma in 2008 while also contributing significantly to the resupply of troops 
in Afghanistan.  In other words, by acquiring a new capability the ADF was 
able to undertake tasks that simply could not have been contemplated 
previously.  Similarly, with the imminent arrival of the LHDs as part of the 
ADF‟s suite of capabilities, it will be very interesting to watch and see just 
how many good reasons there will be for having acquired the capability.  
Such capability should also be tied in closely with Australia's regional 
engagement and aid priorities.  When US Navy LHDs cross South-East Asia 
and the Pacific on the way to the Persian Gulf, for instance, they routinely 
stop along the way and their navy-marine teams conduct focused 
humanitarian assistance missions in places like East Timor and Indonesia, 
earning immense goodwill while materially assisting the needy with 
construction, medical, dental and other support to local communities.  These 
operations test a wide spectrum of military skills considered essential for 
complex warfighting, but which equally are valuable for humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief. 
Implications for the Future 
The Australian Army and the RAN should go and do likewise, focusing on 
projects mutually agreed with states in Australia's neighbourhood including 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor and a range of South Pacific 
countries.  Engagement on strategically chosen development assistance 
projects could generate considerable goodwill towards Australia while 
bolstering the security and stability of the island states affected and, in turn, 
regional security for the states in Australia‟s neighbourhood.  With the 
prospect of increased instability and environmental challenges, short notice 
calls for such assistance are more than likely. 
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From now on, when considering response options in the face of a 
deteriorating security situation in Australia‟s region, a significantly more 
flexible and adaptable capability is available for use.  Conversely, for those 
would-be over-throwers or trouble-makers in the South Pacific, the very 
existence of Australia‟s robust amphibious capability will act as a distinct 
deterrent in the knowledge that extreme action can be counteracted by a 
significant Australian joint force that could arrive off their shore at short 
notice.  
In the meantime, as Australia looks to engage more closely with Indonesia 
and other ASEAN and South Pacific neighbours, constructive engagement 
with engineers, medical and logistic teams alongside local teams may well 
prove ground-breaking, literally and metaphorically.  Such a capability is 
particularly significant when weighing up the security and stability calculus of 
the region and as the ADF reconfigures for life post-Afghanistan, a more 
useful and noble role would be hard to find. 
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